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WHAT DO YOU MEAN MY PARTNERSHIP HAS
BEEN PETITIONED INTO BANKRUPTCY?
I. Introduction
Under present bankruptcy law, an involuntary petition may be
commenced against a partnership by fewer than all of the general
partners in such partnership.' If an involuntary petition is not con-
tested by any of the non-filing partners, the bankruptcy court will or-
der relief for that partnership.2 However, if an involuntary petition,
filed by fewer than all of the general partners, is contested by any or
all of the non-filing partners, the bankruptcy court will order relief
only if it can be shown that the debtor-partnership was "generally not
paying" its debts as they became due.3 In comparison to previous
bankruptcy law, this "generally not paying" test or filing standard,4
regarding partners' involuntary filings against their partnership, is the
most lenient to date. The Bankruptcy Code does not define what
"generally not paying" means. However, the legislative history of the
Code provides that "the court orders relief, after a trial only if the
debtor is generally unable to pay its debts as they mature .... 5
Bankruptcy law regarding partnerships differs from bankruptcy
law pertaining to individuals and corporations. Only a partnership
can be involuntarily petitioned into bankruptcy by individuals within
the organization.6 If fewer than all of the general partners petition the
partnership into bankruptcy, the petition is considered an involuntary
one.7 The threat of an involuntary petition can be a useful bargaining
1. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 § 303(b)(3), 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(3) (1978) [here-
inafter the Code or the Bankruptcy Code]. Because of the adversary character of the
proceedings, a petition filed by fewer than all of the general partners is referred to as a
petition against the partnership. RALPH ANZIVINO, PARTNER AND PARTNERSHIP
BANKRUPTCY § 2.14 (1987).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1992).
3. 11 U.S.C. § 303(h) (1992).
4. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 324 (1977); S. REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1978).
5. Id.
6. For corporations and individuals there are only two ways to file for bankruptcy.
A voluntary petition filed by the corporation or individual, or an involuntary petition
filed by the requisite number of creditors as specified by the applicable Code sections. I I
U.S.C. § 303(b) (1992). For partnerships, however, there are three possible ways to file
for bankruptcy. A voluntary petition can be filed by all of the general partners, an invol-
untary petition can be filed by the appropriate amount of creditors or an involuntary
petition can be filed by less than all of the general partners of the partnership. Partner-
ships are the only entities which can be involuntarily petitioned into bankruptcy by mem-
bers within the organization itself. 11 U.S.C. § 303 (a),(b) (1992).
7. Id.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XIX
chip for petitioning partners. Since the bankruptcy court has a
number of powers which can be used to protect individual partners
and their assets, the lenient filing requirements under which partners
can petition their partnerships into bankruptcy may encourage part-
ners who can personally benefit from filing to do so, even if the act
would be to the detriment of the partnership.8
A partnership is a unique organization form. Under the Uniform
Partnership Act,9 a partnership is not recognized as an entity. Ab-
sent a statute to the contrary, it is impossible to bring suit against a
partnership.' ° It is necessary, therefore, to hold partners personally
liable for their partnership's obligations.1  A partner is either jointly
or jointly and severally liable depending on the attendant circum-
stances. 12 A partner who is jointly liable is responsible for only his
particular share of the obligation. A partner who is jointly and sever-
ally liable, however, is responsible for the entire obligation regardless
of his share. 3
In a Chapter 1114 reorganization case, the problem regarding invol-
untary petitions by partners against a partnership is whether involun-
tary relief in the form of a reorganization should be imposed on the
partnership at the behest of fewer than all of the general partners. 15
8. Partners have a fiduciary duty to one another. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT
§ 21 (1990) [hereinafter U.P.A.]. There are no cases indicating that the filing of an invol-
untary petition is a breach of that duty. Justice Cardozo once described this duty stating,
"[m]any forms of conduct permissible in a workday world for those acting at arm's
length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something
stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an
honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior." Meinhard v. Salmon, 249
N.Y. 458, 460, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).
9. U.P.A. § 9, § 13, § 14 (1990).
10. UPA Revision Subcommittee of the Committee on Partnerships and Unincorpo-
rated Business Organizations, Should the Uniform Partnership Act Be Revised? 43 Bus.
LAW. 121, 124-25 (1987).
11. U.P.A. § 21.
12. The U.P.A. prescribes that partners are only jointly liable. U.P.A. § 15 (1990).
Thus, in order to sue a partnership an individual must normally join all of the partners in
the suit. Many states disagree with this result and resolve the problem by either making
the partnership an entity that can be sued, or by establishing joint and several liability,
therefore, making the joining of partners in a suit unnecessary. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 410.70 (West 1973).
13. He is, however, entitled to contribution from the other partners. U.P.A. § 18.
14. 11 U.S.C. § 1101-74 (1988).
15. Frank R. Kennedy, excerpt from an unpublished treatise, in Gerald K. Smith,
The Financially Distressed Limited Partnership, ALI-ABA RESOURCE MATERIALS
PARTNERSHIPS: UPA, ULPA, SECURITIES, TAXATION, AND BANKRUPTCY 693-94 (4th
ed. 1983). Professor Kennedy argued, "[t]he statute unquestionably purports to provide
for such relief, but if a statute attempts to legislate an impossible result it may be dis-
carded. Is it conceivable that a partnership may be reorganized against its will?" Id.
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Based on their personal liability, individual partners of the debtor-
partnership primarily focus on limiting the extent of their liability.
These partners' concerns often clash with the concerns of the partner-
ship as a whole, 6 creating an atmosphere which may hinder efforts to
effectuate a reorganization.' 7
Under previous bankruptcy law regarding partners' involuntary pe-
titions against their partnerships, relief was not granted unless there
was a finding that the partnership was insolvent. 8 For the most part,
prior to the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, insolvency was defined, by the
balance sheet test.' 9 However, in 1978, Congress enacted the more
lenient "generally not paying" standard as the required criteria for all
involuntary petitions. Although there is evidence that Congress in-
tended to enact this easier "generally not paying" standard to benefit
involuntary petitions by creditors, there are no indications or state-
ments regarding partners' involuntary petitions against their partner-
ships. 20 Additionally, Congress enacted this change in the face of
proposed legislation which acknowledged the special nature of a part-
ner's petition against the partnership and the need either to eliminate
this type of petition or to make this standard more difficult with re-
spect to partners' petitions against the partnership.2' The Congres-
sional record surrounding the enactment of the generally not paying
standard however, fails to address these contrasting views regarding
the partner's ability to commence an involuntary proceeding against
the partnership.
Currently the ease with which a partner can file-under the "gener-
ally not paying" test, coupled with the advantages the bankruptcy
court affords individual partners, encourages partners to file. Stricter
standards need to be implemented to ensure that partnership funds
16. See In re Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg, Manley, Myerson & Casey,
85 B.R. 13 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); In re Wedgewood Golf Assocs., Ltd., 90 B.R. 510
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988).
17. See Kennedy, supra note 15, at 653-54 (asking if involuntary reorganization can
be imposed on a partnership). For example, suppose that two of a partnership's five
general partners file an involuntary Chapter 11 petition against the partnership. Pursu-
ant to § 303(d) of the Code, two of the three non-filing partners can answer the petition
objecting to the bankruptcy and seeking dismissal of the case. If after a hearing, the court
denies this motion to dismiss, the bankruptcy court is then faced with a partnership split
three ways. Two general partners want reorganization, two general partners want to
retain the status quo and one general partner has yet to express his opinion and will be
bound by what the bankruptcy court decides.
18. See infra notes 22, 23, and 24.
19. John C. McCoid II, The Occassion for Involuntary Bankruptcy, 61 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 195, 203-09 (1987).
20. H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 1 (1973).
21. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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available to pay partnership obligations are not wasted on a self-serv-
ing bankruptcy filing. Additionally, these stricter standards are nec-
essary to ensure that the bankruptcy court's time and energy are
expended only on those partnerships in serious need of bankruptcy
relief.
This Note argues that in the case of a partner's petition against the
partnership, the "generally not paying" filing requirement is subject
to abuse by petitioning partners seeking to use the lenient filing stan-
dard to their personal advantage. Part II of the Note summarizes the
history of partner against partnership filings. Part III examines the
protections the bankruptcy court affords partnerships and analyzes
possible malevolent motives a partner might have for filing against his
or her partnership. Part IV explores court and legislative solutions to
the problems presented by partners' filings against their partnership.
This Note concludes with a recommendation for Congress to enact a
stricter filing standard for involuntary petitions by partners against
the partnership, encompassing both a reversion to a strict equity in-
solvency test and the requirement that petitioning partners' capital
account balances constitute at least ten percent of the partnership's
total capital.
II. Legislative History
A. The Bankruptcy Acts
Bankruptcy law has almost always provided a cause of action for a
partner to file an involuntary petition against the partnership.22 The
Bankruptcy Acts of 1841,23 186724 and 193825 expressly provided for
a petition filed by less than all of the general partners of a partnership.
Courts also inferred that the 1898 Act provided such a cause of ac-
tion.26 Each Act required partnership insolvency before relief could
be granted. However, until the Act of 1898, insolvency remained un-
defined by Congress, leaving courts to determine their own definitions
of insolvency 27 or to define insolvency on a case by case basis.
22. Only the Acts of 1800 and 1898 fail to provide this cause of action. Bankruptcy
Act of 1800, 2 Stat. 19, (1880). Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 5, 30 Stat. 544 (revised 1938).
23. Bankruptcy Act of 1841 § 14, 5 Stat. 448 (1841).
24. Bankruptcy Act of 1867 § 36, 14 Stat. 517, 536 (1867).
25. Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 5(b) (revised 1938).
26. Meek v. Centre County Co. 268 U.S. 426, 434 (1925).
27. John C. McCoid II, The Occasion for Involuntary Bankruptcy, 61 AM. BANKR.
L.J 195, 195-200 (1987). Congress and the courts were not always clear on whether
insolvency should be measured by the balance sheet test or by the equity test. The bal-
ance sheet test requires that the debtor's liabilities exceed his assets. The equity test
requires that the debtor's current liabilities exceed his current assets. Id. at 195-96.
[Vol. XIX
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The Act of 1841 expressly provided for a partner against partner-
ship cause of action.28 Section 14 of that Act provided "where two or
more persons who are partners in trade, become insolvent, an order
may be made in the manner provided in this act, either on the petition
of such partners, or any one of them .... ,"29 The Act, however, failed
to define insolvency.30 Therefore, courts chose either the balance
sheet test3 l or the equity test32 for insolvency depending on the cir-
cumstances of the case.33
Similarly, the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 expressly provided for a
partner against partnership cause of action.34 The statute provided
that a partnership's property should be taken and administered in
cases "where two or more persons who are partners ... shall be ad-
judged bankrupt, either on the petition of such partners or any one of
them .... , General Order XVIII provided that a non-consenting
partner had the defense of partnership solvency.36 Like the Act of
1841, the Act of 1867 failed to provide a definition of insolvency, thus
leaving the courts to formulate their own definitions.3 7
Departing from the previous Acts, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 did
not specifically grant or deny a partner's right to file an involuntary
petition against the partnership. Section 5(a) of the Act provided that
"[a] partnership during the continuation of the partnership business
or after its dissolution ... may be adjudged a bankrupt. ' 3 The Act
permitted only two types of petitions, voluntary or involuntary by
creditors, through which a person, including a partnership,39 could be
adjudged bankrupt. Supplementing the Act, however, was General
Order VIII, which provided a non-consenting partner the defense of
partnership solvency. 4° Therefore, some courts inferred that because
the defense for the cause of action existed, the partner against partner-
ship cause of action also existed. 1
A partner's ability to file an involuntary petition against the part-
28. Bankruptcy Act of 1841 § 14.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. For a definition of the balance sheet test, see supra note 27.
32. For a definition of the equity test, see supra note 27.
33. See McCoid, supra note 19, at 195-200.
34. Bankruptcy Act of 1867 § 36.
35. Id.
36. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, General Order No. XVIII.
37. Bankruptcy Act of 1867 § 39. See also McCoid, supra note 19.
38. Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 5(a).
39. Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 1(19).
40. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, General Order No. VIII.
41. Meek v. Centre County Co., 268 U.S. 426, 429-31 (1925).
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nership and the non-consenting partners' defense of partnership sol-
vency retained their effective status until 1925. In 1925 the Supreme
Court in Meek v. Centre County Banking Co.,42 nullified the Act of
1898's General Order VIII.43 The Court held that a petition filed by
one partner against the partnership and its non-consenting members
was an involuntary petition unauthorized by the Act." The Court
reasoned that General Order VIII, in purporting to authorize the fil-
ing by one or less than all of the partners, did not relate to the execu-
tion of any of the provisions of the Act itself. Therefore the order was
without statutory warrant and had no effect.45
A partner's ability to file an involuntary petition against the part-
nership remained dormant until the Act of 1938. Section 5(b) of that
Act provided:
[a] petition may be filed by one or more or all of the general part-
ners in the separate behalf of a partnership or jointly in behalf of a
partnership and of the general partner or partners filing the same:
Provided, however, [t]hat where a petition is filed in behalf of a
partnership by less than all of the general partners, the petition
shall allege that the partnership is insolvent. A petition may be
filed separately against a partnership or jointly against a partner-
ship and one or more or all of its general partners.46
Consistent with the earlier General Orders XVIII and VIII, section
18 of the Act permitted non-consenting partners the defense of sol-
vency of the partnership.47
Nothing in the 1938 Act indicated substantive reasons for permit-
ting a partner to file an involuntary petition against the partnership. 8
Rather, as the House Judiciary Committee Report stated, the changes
were procedural in nature.49 Under section 9 of the report entitled
"Amendments To Provide A More Workable Partnership Section,"
the Committee explained that the Act of 1898 did not provide for the
filing of a joint petition by or against the partnership. The Committee
stated that this inability resulted in confusion in procedure." The
report implied that by allowing these causes of action, confusion
42. 268 U.S. 426 (1925).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 432.
45. Id.
46. Bankruptcy Act of 1938 § 5(b). Insolvency was defined by the balance sheet test.
47. Section 18 provided that a non-assenting partner had the right to controvert the
allegation of insolvency. Bankruptcy Act of 1938 § 18. See also Mason v. Mitchell, 135
F.2d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1943).
48. Mitchell, 135 F. 2d at 601.
49. H.R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., (1937).
50. Id. at § 9(a)-(b).
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would cease and a more expeditious practice would result.51
Despite numerous proposals in Congress, from 1938 to 1978, the
law controlling partners' petitions against the partnership remained
unchanged.52 In July 1973, the Report of the Commission on the
Bankruptcy Laws expressed concern that a partner might use the abil-
ity to file against the partnership for personal benefit. Voicing this
concern, the report stated:
[i]f one general partner does not concur, the petition by the other
partners is involuntary. The essential difference between the part-
ners' petition and a creditor's involuntary petition is the ground for
filing. Under this subdivision, [dealing with a partner's petition]
the sole test is insolvency .... To avoid the possibility of undue
pressure by a partner with little to lose, the value of each partner's
net worth, if any ...is added to the value of the partnership
property.
53
Congress never passed this amendment.
Also, Congress did not enact the original version of the Reform Act
of 1978. 54 This version lacked a provision permitting the filing by less
than all of the general partners against the partnership. The accom-
panying explanatory notes to House Report 8200 highlighted this
omission, declaring, "[t]here is no provision similar to section 5(b) of
the Bankruptcy Act [1938] permitting an involuntary petition to be
filed against a partnership by less than all of the partners on the
grounds of its insolvency. '55 These notes reasoned that providing for
such a cause of action was unnecessary because partners would collec-
tively take voluntary action when necessary.5 6
B. Insolvency and the Three Filing Standards
Insolvency is generally defined by one of two commonly accepted
definitions. First, under balance sheet insolvency, a debtor is insol-
vent when his total liabilities exceed his total assets.5 7 In contrast,
under the second definition, equity insolvency, a debtor is insolvent
when his current liabilities exceed his current assets.58
Although only two definitions of insolvency exist, there are three
51. Id. See also Mitchell, 135 F.2d at 601.
52. See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (15th ed. 1979) (Legislative History Appendix).
53. H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. Part II, § 4-206 (1973).
54. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
55. Id.
56. Id. ("Rather, it is contemplated that voluntary action would be taken under 11
U.S.C. 301 ... ").
57. See McCoid, supra note 19 at 195-97.
58. Id.
1992] 839
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filing standards regarding partners' petitions against the partnership:
the equity insolvency test, the balance sheet insolvency test and the
"generally not paying" test. The tests for both equity insolvency and
balance sheet insolvency are relatively simple. The equity insolvency
test measures whether current liabilities exceed current assets and the
balance sheet insolvency test determines whether total liabilities ex-
ceed total assets. The "generally not paying" test, however, is not as
straightforward as the insolvency tests. Although the Code's legisla-
tive history suggests that the "generally not paying" test is synony-
mous with the equity insolvency test,5" it is possible to be generally
not paying one's debts when due and still have current assets in excess
of current liabilities.' Therefore, the Code incorrectly equates the
equity insolvency test and the "generally not paying" test, since, when
applied to the same facts, the two tests may yield different results.
Today, less than all of the general partners can file an involuntary
petition against the partnership.6 1 The partnership need only be gen-
erally not paying its debts as they become due in order for a filing
partner to successfully petition his partnership into bankruptcy.62
The legislative history of section 303 states that the generally not pay-
ing test is the most significant departure from the 1938 law concern-
ing the grounds for involuntary bankruptcy, which required balance
sheet insolvency and an act63 of bankruptcy. 6
III. Bankruptcy Court Protection for Partners and Partnerships
The current "generally not paying" standard presents an easier bur-
den for filing partners,65 in turn, opening avenues to bankruptcy court
previously unavailable to partners and their partnerships. Problems
inherent in a partner's ability to file an involuntary petition against
the partnership fall into two general categories. First, there exist ar-
59. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 324 (1977); S. REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1978).
60. See also Michael J. Grindstaff & Thomas M. Hacke, Note, Involuntary Bank-
ruptcy: The Generally Not Paying Standard, 33 MERCER L. REV. 903, 905 (1983). Eq-
uity insolvency ... focused on the debtor's inability to meet his obligations. The equity
insolvency test under section 303(h)(1) of the Code deletes any mention of inability, but
instead looks to whether the debtor is generally not paying his debts as they become due.
Id.
61. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(3)(A) (1992).
62. 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1) (1992).
63. An act of bankruptcy occurred when a person conveyed, transferred, concealed or
removed, part of his property with the intent to defraud, delay, or hinder his creditors; or
when a person transferred while insolvent a portion of his property to one or more credi-
tors with the intent to prefer such creditors over the others. Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 3.
64. See H.R. REP. No. 595; S, REP. No. 989.
65. Id.
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eas of protection provided by the Code which, by their nature, are
vulnerable to abuse by a partner seeking to serve personal interests.66
Second, in Chapter 11 reorganization cases, a bankruptcy court is
faced with piecing back together a partnership unbalanced because of
partners who are only concerned with limiting the extent of their per-
sonal liability.
To understand how a partner may personally benefit from filing
against the partnership, knowledge of the benefits of the Code to a
debtor-partnership is necessary. One of the fundamental protections
provided by the Bankruptcy Code is the automatic stay.67 The auto-
matic stay gives the partner and debtor-partnership a breathing spell
from their creditors.68 The stay also protects creditors by providing
the time necessary to effectuate an orderly reorganization or liquida-
tion procedure. 69 Although the automatic stay provides the debtor,
property of the debtor and property of the estate protection,70 the pri-
mary area of protection focuses on securing the property of the estate
from creditor actions. 71 The moment the bankruptcy petition is filed,
the protections of the stay take effect.72
Another source of protection provided by the Code is found in sec-
tion 105.73 Section 105 states: "[t]he court may issue any order, pro-
cess, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the
provisions of this title."' 74 This power is often referred to as the bank-
ruptcy courts' equitable power.75
The protection of partnership property held in the partner's name
is one area of particualar interest to partners. Regarding protection of
these ownership interests from partnership creditor actions, the Bank-
ruptcy Court for the District of Colorado held that liens filed after the
petition was filed, against partnership property purchased and main-
tained with partnership funds but not held in the partnership name,
were invalid.7 6 The court reasoned that unless a contrary intention is
66. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1992).
67. Id.
68. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340-42 (1977); S. REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 49-51 (1978).
69. Id.
70. RALPH ANZIVINO, PARTNER AND PARTNERSHIP BANKRUPTCY, § 4.1 (1987).
The commencement of a case under § 303 creates an estate. 11 U.S.C. § 303. What is
considered property of the estate is governed by chap. 5, subch. 3 of the Code. 11 U.S.C.
§ 503 (1992).
71. RALPH ANZIVINO, PARTNER AND PARTNERSHIP BANKRUPTCY § 4.2 (1987).
72. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1978, amended 1984).
73. 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1992).
74. Id.
75. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1978).
76. In re Don/Mark Partnership, 14 B.R. 830 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981).
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apparent, the bankruptcy estate includes any equitable interests of the
partnership in the property because partnership funds were used to
purchase the property.77 Therefore the property, held only in the
partner's name, was protected as though it were actually property of
the debtor-partnership itself.
Certain Code protections extended to the individual partners of a
debtor-partnership highlight the possibility of use or misuse of the
Bankruptcy Code for the personal benefit of the individual partners.
With respect to collection actions by creditors against partners, courts
have used sections 10578 and 362, 7 to determine the extent of protec-
tion to afford partners of a debtor-partnership. In In re Northlake
Building Partners," a secured creditor was denied relief from the au-
tomatic stay to proceed against principals of the debtor partnership.8 '
Included in those the creditor pursued was a general partner who had
personally guaranteed the partnership's secured debt.12 The court re-
fused to lift the stay, indicating that the stay could be extended to
protect general partners of the debtor-partnership.8
3
In addition to the automatic stay, the bankruptcy court has broad
powers under section 105 which may also be used to protect debtor-
partnerships and their partners.8 4 Applying this power to collection
actions against individual partners of debtor-partnerships, a Michigan
bankruptcy court enjoined collection actions against individual part-
ners. 5 Section 105 requires that the court only use this power to ad-
77. Id. at 833.
78. 11 U.S.C. 105.
79. 11 U.S.C. 362.
80. 25 B.R. 543 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1982).
81. While this case has the effect of protecting the partners, the court's reasoning
extended only to the fact that the creditor was oversecured and therefore adequately
protected. Id.
82. Id. at 544.
83. Id. at 545. Contra In re Aboussie Bros. Constr. Co., 8 B.R. 302 (Bankr. E.D. Mo.
1981) (holding that the automatic stay only extends to the partnership debtor and not the
legally distinct general partners; In re Autobahn Classics, Inc., 29 B.R. 625 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y 1983) (recognizing the separate identities of the partner and partnership and
holding that the lessor could proceed against the nonbankrupt partner who was the lessee
on the lease as an individual).
84. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1992). Section 105 states:
[t]he court may issue any order, process, or judgement that is necessary or ap-
propriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of this title
providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be construed to
preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or making any determi-
nation necessary to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an
abuse of process.
Id.
85. Old Orchard Inv. Co. v. A.D.I. Distribs. Inc., 31 B.R. 599 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1983). Contra In re Landmark Air Fund II, 19 B.R. 556, 560 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982).
[Vol. XIX
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vance the bankruptcy proceedings to include actions that are "related
to" the proceeding.8 6 The court in Old Orchard Investment Co. v.
A.D.I. Distributors, Inc. 7 stated that because the individual partners
are personally liable for partnership debts," any depletion of the part-
ner's assets necessarily affects the partnership's ability to reorganize,
and therefore collection actions against individual partners are related
to the partnership bankruptcy case.8 9 The court stressed that there
would be important repercussions to the debtor-partnership if some
creditors were allowed unrestricted access to a partner's assets.90
In addition to the bankruptcy court's power under sections 105 and
362, the court may protect individual partners by confirming a reor-
ganization plan which limits or even extinguishes the extent of per-
sonal liability each partner has to the partnership creditors.9' In the
Chapter 11 bankruptcy case for the Myerson and Kuhn law partner-
ship,92 the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York
confirmed a reorganization plan which prohibited the partnership's
creditors from proceeding against the individual partners, even
though those partners were liable under the joint and several theo-
ries9 3 of liability.94
This personal protection afforded general partners by some bank-
ruptcy courts may be a contributing factor to a partner's decision to
In Landmark the partnership financed the purchase of an aircraft through a bank. Nine
general partners personally guaranteed the note, also giving a security interest in the
aircraft. The bank received a judgement against the partners and partnership when both
defaulted. Immediately, six of the general partners filed an involuntary Chapter 11 peti-
tion against the partnership. The partnership and seven of its general partners moved to
enjoin the bank from undertaking collection efforts against the individual partners. The
court declined to issue an order under section 105 of the Code. After deciding the part-
nership had been organized for the purpose of utilizing an investment tax credit, the court
concluded "[t]he issuance of an injunction to protect them from the risk of liability they
voluntarily assumed, it would seem, would promote the use of a tax avoidance scheme of
questionable benefit to the public which.., would hinder the efforts of bonafide creditors
to collect their just due." Id. at 560.
86. Id. at 601.
87. Id. at 599.
88. U.P.A. §§ 21, 22.
89. 31 B.R. 599, 601 (W.D. Mich. 1983).
90. Although this dictum tends to indicate the possibility that the court's power
under section 105 may be extended to protect partners' interests other than collection
suits relating to debts of the partnership, the court limited its holding to enjoining only
claims that could have been brought against the partnership.
91. Myerson and Kuhn, No. 89/13346, (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) (amended confirmation
plan).
92. Id.
93. For an explanation of a partner's joint and/or several liability for partnership
obligations, see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 91.
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file an involuntary petition against a partnership. Although there is
no express requirement that a Chapter 11 petition must be filed in
good faith, some courts have held that there is an implied good faith
requirement.9" Since it is often unclear which actions constitute bad
faith,96 some courts are reluctant to dismiss petitions based on seem-
ingly bad faith.97 The "generally not paying" test adds to the diffi-
culty in determining bad faith filings by permitting easy access to the
bankruptcy court. Consequently, with the possible personal protec-
tion partners may gain through filing an involuntary petition, coupled
with the lack of an effective good faith filing requirement to deter friv-
olous filings, partners have little to lose from filing an involuntary
petition against the partnership.
Additionally, filing partners may gain a strategic advantage from
the procedural structure of the Code. Although non-filing partners
are permitted to answer98 an involuntary petition, creditors are not.99
Creditors lack an efficient means to attract immediate court attention
to possible malevolent filing motives of the partner. Therefore, while
the court may later determine it appropriate to dismiss, the filing part-
ner will have already received a stalling benefit.
The second problem with this relaxed filing standard relates only to
Chapter 11 cases. The filing standard requires the court to piece back
together a partnership where one or more partners have filed for
bankruptcy without the consent of, or against the will of, the other
partners." In In re Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg,
Manley, Myerson & Casey,"'1 the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of New York acknowledged how difficult it could be to adju-
dicate a partnership bankruptcy.102 In this case the general partners
of the partnership sought appointment of a general partners' commit-
tee in order to assist in the reorganization.103 The court refused to
appoint a committee of general partners reasoning that one of the pri-
mary purposes of a committee is to negotiate, where as in this in-
95. In re Winshall Settlor's Trust, 758 F.2d 1136, (6th Cir. 1985); In re Albany Part-
ners Ltd., 749 F.2d 670 (1 1th Cir. 1984).
96. See In re Wedgewood Golf Assocs., Ltd., 90 B.R. 510, 512 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1988).
97. Carlos J. Cuevas, When Should a Chapter 11 Case Be Dismissed for Bad Faith
Filing?, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 23, 1991, at 1, 3.
98. Bankruptcy Rule 101 l(a), 11 U.S.C. (Appendix) (1989).
99. Id.
100. One of the most interesting questions presented by Code provisions is whether
involuntary relief can be imposed on a partnership. Kennedy, supra note 15.
101. 85 B.R. 13 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988).
102. Id. at 16-18.
103. Id.
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stance, each partner was racing to minimize or avoid the personal
liability to the debtor-partnership's creditors. 1°4
Moreover, in some cases where the personal concerns of the part-
ners inhibit the reorganization, a court's reluctance to find bad faith
results in a waste of valuable court time and the partnership debtor's
money which reasonably should be used to pay the partnership obli-
gations. For example, in In re Wedgewood Golf Associates, Ltd. 105 the
Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida dismissed one
voluntary petition for and two involuntary petitions against the
debtor-partnership, all of which were filed by two of the general part-
ners of such partnership. 106 Although the first two petitions, Wedge-
wood I (voluntary) and Wedgewood II (first involuntary), were
dismissed based on technical failure to meet Code requirements, 10 7
Wedgewood III (second involuntary) was dismissed based on the find-
ing that the debtor-limited partnership would not be able to effectuate
a meaningful reorganization because of an irreconcilable dissension
among the internal management of the partnership. 08  Even though
the court inferred that the involuntary petition was intentionally filed
to forestall a creditor action against the partnership, 0 9 Wedgewood
held that internal strife alone was not sufficient to establish that al-
leged general partners or counsel acted in bad faith in filing the bank-
ruptcy petitions.1 10
Resolution of Wedgewood required court evaluation of the partner-
ship's internal difficulties.111 When the ultimate outcome results in
dismissal and more appropriate remedies exist, 1'2 such extensive court
104. Id. at 18.
105. 90 B.R. 510 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988).
106. Id. at 512.
107. SPI, a general partner of Wedgewood, objected to the voluntary petition because
it did not consent to the filing. Id. at 511. The court dismissed the petition (Wedgewood
1) finding that it was an unauthorized voluntary petition. The filing general partners were
joined by one other general partner in the filing of the first involuntary petition (Wedge-
wood I). The court dismissed Wedgewood II on the basis that the petition was not veri-
fied, and accordingly was in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1746 and Bankruptcy Rule 1008.
Id.
108. Id.
109. The court infers that the petition was filed to stall this creditors foreclosure ac-
tion. Id. at 513.
110. In re Wedgewood Golf Assocs., Ltd., 90 B.R. 570, 513 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988).
111. Id.
112. For example, in In re Williamsburg Suites, Ltd., the court dismissed an involun-
tary petition filed by a general partner reasoning that applicable Virginia partnership law
established comprehensive and detailed procedure for determination of rights of general
partners and creditors, and therefore the creditors and debtor partnership would be better
of with state procedures than the often cumbersome and expensive bankruptcy process.
117 B.R. 216, 219-20 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990).
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participation is judicially wasteful, and unnecessarily depletes the
amount of funds a partnership has to pay off its obligations.
Similarly, in In re Williamsburg Suites, Ltd.'I" the Bankruptcy
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed an involuntary
Chapter 11 petition filed by a general partner against the partnership
because discord among the partners made continuation of the part-
nership impossible." 4 This discord is highlighted in the facts sur-
rounding this case. A general partner filed in state court for
dissolution of the partnership alleging that the partnership was dis-
solved by acts of the general partners and also by operation of law.' 15
Prior to a decision by the state court, a creditor of the partnership
filed a notice of default on a note secured by a deed of trust on the
partnership's principal asset." 16 That same day, one of the other gen-
eral partners, a defendant in the state court dissolution action, filed an
involuntary bankruptcy petition against the partnership, staying the
dissolution proceeding as well as any other action against the partner-
ship." I The partner in the state court dissolution action sought relief
from the stay regarding that action. The stay was lifted and the state
court entered a decree dissolving the partnership."
8
Eventually, the Williamsburg court dismissed the involuntary peti-
tion, reasoning that applicable Virginia partnership law established
comprehensive and detailed procedures for determination of rights of
general partners and creditors." 9 Thus it was in the parties' best inter-
ests to dismiss the case.' 20 If the partner filing the involuntary peti-
tion had not immediately filed, the state court would have entered its
decision and the partnership would have been dissolved according to
state law procedures. Since this outcome was the same as that ulti-
mately reached by the bankruptcy court,' 2 ' the bankruptcy court's
participation was judicially wasteful and its participation unnecessa-
rily depleted the amount of partnership funds available to pay off
partnership obligations.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 217.
116. Id.
117. In re Williamsburg Suites, Ltd., 117 B.R. 216 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990).
118. Id. at 217.
119. Id. at 219.
120. Id. at 219-20.
121. Evidenced in the transcript of the circuit courts bench ruling, the court intended
to appoint a receiver to take control and distribute the partnership assets, but the imposi-
tion of the bankruptcy case precluded such a measure. Id.
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IV. Legislative and Judicial Solutions
Partners can use the Code and the present "generally not paying"
standard to their strategic advantage. When this personal advantage
contradicts the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code, bankruptcy courts
must dispose of the situation as the law warrants. This disposition
generally means an expensive bankruptcy proceeding which may
leave many creditors empty-handed.
Solutions to the problem are troublesome. Applications of already
operative Code sections require scrupulous, often wasteful, court eval-
uation of partner filings against the partnership under the "generally
not paying" standard, as illustrated in the Wedgewood and Williams-
burg cases. ' 22 Nonetheless, the potential for misuse and judicial waste
presented by the involuntary petitions by partners against the partner-
ship requires implementation of an effective solution.
One solution is to rewrite the filing standard in an attempt to ensure
that the needs of the partnership and not those of the filing partner
prompt the involuntary filing of the bankruptcy petition by a partner.
Reversion to a strict equity insolvency test with an additional require-
ment that filing partners' capital account balances constitute at least
ten percent of the total capital of the partnership is one way of accom-
plishing this assurance. The stricter equity insolvency standard
avoids requiring the bankruptcy courts' exertion of judicial resources
on a partnership by confirming that the partnership no longer main-
tains enough current assets to pay its current obligations. Such a
standard prevents partners from being able to use the protection pro-
vided by the bankruptcy court to their personal advantage. This stan-
dard also forces partners seeking to file a bankruptcy petition to
resolve their differences with other partners in order to file a volun-
tary petition, or if such differences cannot be resolved, to file instead
with the state for a state dissolution of the partnership.' 23 Addition-
ally, requiring filing partners to have a sufficient percentage of capital
invested in the partnership serves to ensure that they have enough of
an interest in the partnership to be concerned with a successful reor-
ganization of their partnership. 24
The stricter filing standard, by limiting easy access to the bank-
ruptcy court, forces all partners to participate actively in the decision
to file for bankruptcy. Since partners are generally personally liable
122. See supra notes 105, 112 and accompanying text.
123. U.P.A. § 32 (1990).
124. This requirement is similar to the requirement for creditors' involuntary petitions
mandating that petitioning creditors or of a certain number and are due at least "X"
amount of dollars. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 303 (b)(1), (2).
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for partnership debts,'25 access to the bankruptcy court is an impor-
tant resource for partners. Switching to a strict equity insolvency
standard would be effective in saving judicial resources because it
would force partners in financially deteriorating partnerships to re-
solve differences and file voluntarily for bankruptcy, thus saving court
time and partnership money which would have been required to re-
solve these differences in bankruptcy court.
This filing standard change would not affect the creditor filing stan-
dard. Creditors would still be able to file an involuntary petition
against a partnership under the "generally not paying" test when such
partnership was generally not paying its debts as they became due,
regardless of the filing standard applied to a partner's petition against
the partnership.
Moreover, the current "generally not paying" filing standard for
partners' petitions against their partnership was rejected as the appro-
priate standard by the Report of the Commission of the Bankruptcy
Laws of the United States. 126 Although the Commission's recommen-
dations detailed the need for involuntary relief based on the "gener-
ally not paying" filing standard for creditors, the report firmly stated
that partners did not need such a lenient filing standard.
127
The Commission instead recommended that involuntary relief
against a partnership on a petition by less than all the general partners
should remain available when the partnership is insolvent under the
balance sheet test, taking into account the value of each partner's net
worth.1 21 Since the balance-sheet insolvency test can be met by
stretching debt obligations over the long term, it is an easier filing
requirement than the equity insolvency test, which measures the short
term. However, by requiring that the total amount of the partner-
ship's assets be increased by the value of each partner's net worth, the
Commission recommended a very strict filing standard.
This standard, although stricter and thus better than the "generally
not paying" standard, placed the expensive burden of producing evi-
125. U.P.A. § 12 (1990).
126. H.R. Doc. No. 137.
127. Id. In arguing for the abandonment of the concept of the acts of bankruptcy and
the balance sheet test, the report stated "[i]t is time to abandon the complex, litigation-
producing constraints and substitute the test of inability or failure to pay debts as the
basis for initiating involuntary bankruptcy. . . . It is better policy to accommodate a
proceeding for the benefit of all creditors under the federal legislation than to require
individual creditor action which only benefits the aggressive creditor." While detailing
the great need for involuntary relief based on the lenient "generally not paying" filing
standard in the context of a creditor's filing, the report never extended this need to invol-
untary filings by partners against partnerships. Id.
128. Id.
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dence of the value of each general partner's property on the partners
contesting the involuntary petition. Since contesting a petition would
deplete partnership assets which should be used to pay the partner-
ship's obligations, the standard proposed by the Commission fails to
adequately protect the creditors of the partnership.
Reverting to a strict equity insolvency standard is not without
flaws. ' 29 The equity standard is more difficult to meet and thus keeps
the financially deteriorating partnership outside the Code's protec-
tion. However, based on the personal liability shared by partners for
debts of the partnership, there exists a strong incentive for the part-
nership to seek reorganization so partners will not be called on to
answer for the debts of the partnership. Thus, partners may find it
necessary to resolve differences and file a voluntary bankruptcy peti-
tion in order to reorganize their partnership successfully and to avoid
liability.
So apparent was this incentive to legislators, that in the original
version of the Reform Act of 1978 they left out a provision permitting
the filing by less than all of the general partners against the partner-
ship.130 The notes proposed that the cause of action was unnecessary
because partners would take voluntary action when necessary.1 31
There is a strong indication, therefore, that a stricter filing standard
would not keep financially wrought partnerships out of bankruptcy,
but would create a greater incentive for a voluntary filing, based on
consent of all general partners, which is necessary to petition the part-
nership into bankruptcy.
Additionally, a stricter filing standard is needed since the court's
sanctioning power under the Code does not effectively deter partners
from filing unnecessary petitions. Section 303(i)(2) provides that if the
court dismisses a petition under this section other than on consent of
129. In discussing the vast problems with current bankruptcy law concerning partners
and partnerships, Professor Frank R. Kennedy and Professor Gerald K. Smith stated
[t]here are good reasons for the number and scope of unsettled questions that
arise in the cases that involve partnerships and partners. One is a healthy skep-
ticism as to the likelihood that legislation can be drafted, let alone enacted,
which will provide more satisfactory solutions to particular problems than can
be formulated by the parties their counsel, trustees, the United States trustee,
and the courts. Another is the difficulty of developing a consensus required for
the formulation of statutory language with respect to such matters as the role of
a managing partner during the pendency of a partnership reorganization case.
Frank R. Kennedy & Gerald K. Smith, Some Issues In Partnership and Partner Bank-
ruptcy Cases and Recommendations for Legislative Change, in ALI-ABA RESOURCE
MATERIALS PARTNERSHIPS: UPA, ULPA, SECURITIES, TAXATION, AND BANKRUPTCY
(9th ed. 1990).
130. See supra note 20.
131. See supra note 55.
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all petitioners and the debtor against any petitioner that filed the peti-
tion in bad faith, the court can award damages.' 32  The Wedgewood
court declined to impose sanctions after dismissing three separate pe-
titions.'33 Since imposition of sanctions requires the finding of bad
faith, 134 there is an unwillingness to impose sanctions.135 This unwill-
ingness undermines the effectiveness of this section of the Code with
regard to partners' involuntary petitions against their partnerships.
Section 305 is also ineffective in dealing with partners' involuntary
petitions against the partnership. In Williamsburg the court dis-
missed the petition under section 305.136 Section 305 provides "[t]he
court, after notice and a hearing, may dismiss a case under this title,
or may suspend all proceedings in a case under this title, at any time
if: (1) the interests of creditors and the debtor would be better served
by such dismissal or suspension ... The Williamsburg court de-
termined that because of the expense and inconvenience of the bank-
ruptcy process, it was in the creditors' and debtor-partnership's best
interest to dismiss the case when state dissolution procedures were
more efficient.' 38 However, the court's determination regarding what
was in the best interests of the parties required valuable court re-
sources which could have been saved had a stricter filing standard
been in place to permit only those partnerships which were truly in
financial difficulty to file initially.
39
When a bankruptcy court is confronted with a partner's involun-
tary petition against the partnership, the court must probe the filing
partners' motives for filing. Implementation of a stricter filing stan-
dard will save valuable court time because fewer partners will be ca-
pable of meeting the stricter standard and will therefore be forced to
mend their differences and file a voluntary bankruptcy petition.
Therefore, the stricter filing standard would save court time that
would have been required to resolve these differences during the bank-
ruptcy proceedings. Without enactment of the stricter filing standard
for partner against partnership actions, the bankruptcy court will
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. 11 U.S.C. § 303 (i)(2) (1992).
135. See Thomas M. Byrne, Sanctions for Wrongful Bankruptcy Litigation, 62 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 109, 111-15 (1991); see also William S. Parkinson, The Contempt Power of
the Bankruptcy Court Fact or Fiction: The Debate Continues, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 591,
597-601 (1991) (analyzing the uncertainty surrounding the bankruptcy court's contempt
power).
136. In re Williamsburg Suites, Ltd., 117 B.R. 216 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990).
137. 11 U.S.C. § 305(a)(1) (1992).
138. 117 B.R. at 220.
139. See Williamsburg, 117 B.R. 216.
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need to expend its time and energy to determine if dismissal is
necessary.
V. Conclusion
Under present bankruptcy law, an involuntary petition may be
commenced against a partnership by fewer than all of the general
partners in such partnership. In comparison to prior bankruptcy pro-
visions governing a partner's involuntary petition against the partner-
ship, the "generally not paying" test is the most lenient to date.
Because a partner's filing against the partnership under the "generally
not paying" test entangles such enormous bankruptcy court participa-
tion in mediating partnership disputes and in evaluating possible ill
will of filing partners, the Code, creditors and non-filing partners
would be better served with a stricter filing standard for involuntary
petitions against the partnership. Congress, therefore, should enact a
new filing standard for these types of petitions, requiring two things:
first, that partners filing the involuntary petition have capital account
balances totalling at least ten percent of the total capital of the part-
nership; and second, that the partnership must be insolvent under a
strict equity insolvency test.
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